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“A MATTER OF EXTREME URGENCY”
Theodore Roosevelt, Wilhelm II, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902
Edmund Morris
On the evening of 2 June 1897, an extraordinary meeting of minds tookplace at the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island. In addition to
the assistant secretary of the Navy, who was the main speaker, the stage was
shared by an ornithologist, a paleontologist, a zoologist, and a taxidermist.
There was an expert on the naval logistics of the War of 1812. There was a
Dresden-educated socialite, fluent in German, French, and English, and able to
read Italian. There was a New York State assemblyman, a North Dakota rancher,
an eminent historian, a biographer, a big-game hunter, a conservationist, a civil
service reformer, a professional politician, and a police commissioner. All these
men were called Theodore Roosevelt.
In 1897, he was still only thirty-eight years old. Soon he was to become colo-
nel of the Rough Riders regiment in Cuba, a recognized war hero, then governor
of New York, vice president, and president of the
United States. In later years, Roosevelt would be a
winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, president of the
American Historical Association, South American ex-
plorer, and the author of some forty books.
The 1897 address to the Naval War College was the
first great speech of Roosevelt’s career—a fanfare, a call
to arms.1 “TR,” as he was already popularly known, had
been assistant secretary of the Navy for less than eight
weeks but was already an enthusiastic, not-too-private
plotter to bring about the Spanish-American
War—which he was to do almost single-handedly. That
night he took as his text George Washington’s precept,
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“To be prepared for war is the most effectual means to promote peace.”2 He man-
aged to repeat the word “war” sixty-seven times before he sat down. TR was in
those years a big-navy man, an unashamed imperialist, and a “Monroe Doctri-
naire,” obsessed with the idea of getting the Old World out of the New World.
Henry James, who was exactly the reverse of these things, called him “the mere
monstrous embodiment of unprecedented and unresounding noise.”
In the next few years a very different Theodore Roosevelt was to emerge, a
man transformed by the shock of the presidency into a commander in chief
who accomplished much of his grand strategy in silence and secrecy. Notwith-
standing TR’s extraordinary dominance of the American political scene, by
1905—when James, reassured by his mature moderation and dignified bearing,
dubbed him Theodore Rex—he was the most gentlemanly of American chief ex-
ecutives. He did not cease to be a big-navy man; he raised the U.S. Navy from
fifth to third place internationally during his seven and a half years in office, and
it was he who sent the Great White Fleet around the world in 1908 and 1909. He
did not hesitate to deploy all the firepower in his arsenal when circumstances
called for it. Nonetheless, his presidency (once he had quelled a rebellion in the
Philippines, inherited from William McKinley) was peaceful. It was peaceful
largely because foreign rulers were aware that Theodore Roosevelt never bluffed.
The Venezuela incident of late 1902 is the locus classicus of his famously collo-
quial foreign policy, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”
The Venezuelan crisis of 1902 is not an unfamiliar episode in U.S. history. It has
all the ingredients that attract scholars: drama, contradictions, mysteriously de-
stroyed evidence, and the fictionalizing tendencies of human memory. Over the
years TR himself offered a number of versions of the story.3 He was noticeably
circumspect about it as long as he remained in office. Only after leaving the
White House did he reveal, at first in strict confidence, that in November and
December of 1902 “the United States was on the verge of war with Germany.”
Even after the outbreak of World War I, his allusions to what he called “the Vene-
zuela business” were cryptic. Almost a century had to pass before cohering bits
of evidence suggested beyond further doubt that the basic facts of Roosevelt’s
account were accurate—and that he had remained silent during his presidency
to spare the vanity of an emperor. The full extent of the crisis still has to be in-
ferred from the existence of an extraordinary void, hinting at some vanished
enormity, in the archives of three nations: the United States, Germany, and
Britain.
Roosevelt had seen the Venezuela crisis coming for eleven months. It involved
a then-familiar situation—failure by a Latin American republic to repay its
foreign loans. Venezuela owed about sixty-two million bolivars to an impatient
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consortium headed by Great Britain and Germany. These powers, acting in alli-
ance, proposed to blockade Venezuela with a multinational armada until the
debts were paid off. Both nations scrupulously assured the United States that
they were interested in debt col-
lection only; that they had no de-
sire to establish footholds in the
Western Hemisphere. TR sympa-
thized with their predicament. He
blamed President Cipriano Cas-
tro of Venezuela for ignoring honorable obligations. As he robustly advised a
German diplomat, “If any South American country misbehaves toward any Eu-
ropean country, let the European country spank it.” However, he also made it
clear that “the punishment should not take the form of acquisition of territory
by any non-American power.”
A secret memorandum from Rear Admiral Henry Clay Taylor, chief of the
Bureau of Navigation (an office then close to the center of naval policy making),
warned the president that Germany’s disclaimer of territorial ambitions was less
trustworthy than Britain’s. Taylor felt sure that if Castro resisted the blockade,
the German navy would bombard Venezuela and then demand an indemnity.
But President Castro had no money. Admiral Taylor laid out in logical steps what
would likely follow:
Item—Venezuela . . . could offer nothing but territory, or she could mortgage her
revenue in such a way as to place herself in complete political dependence on Ger-
many. The United States could not allow either of these, and yet Germany’s right to
indemnity would be incontestable. The only courses open to the United States
[would be] payment of the indemnity taking such security as she can from Venezuela
or war.4
Admiral Taylor’s argument had a certain crude force, and the president was
saddened by the prospect. “I have a hearty and genuine liking for the Germans,”
he said, “both individually and as a nation.”5 German blood flowed in his veins;6
he could recite long passages of the Niebelungenleid by heart; Frederick the Great
and Otto von Bismarck were among his heroes. He welcomed the idea of Ger-
man capital investment in Latin America, on the ground that countries like Ven-
ezuela would benefit from outside development. However, Roosevelt agreed
with Taylor that Germany seemed to want more than dividends in the New
World. He noted an ominous sentence in Berlin’s written commitment to Brit-
ain: “We would consider the temporary occupation on our part of different Ven-
ezuelan harbor places.”
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The adjective “temporary” reminded TR that in 1898 Kaiser Wilhelm II had
“temporarily” acquired Kiaochow in China, on a lease that His Majesty had
somehow lengthened to ninety-nine years. Germany’s well known shortage of
lebensraum—“living space”—had translated by 1902 into an explosive need for
new horizons. Burgeoning yet constrained on both east and west, Germany had
to feed a million new mouths every year, and it had to market the output of an
economy doubling in size every decade. Its army was already, in 1902, the most
formidable in the world, and now it was building a new navy. This combination
of social, economic, and strategic aggrandizement indicated to a president well
versed in German history that a new European empire was rising, just as the sun
was beginning to set on German South-West Africa. What better place to estab-
lish a collection house today, a colony tomorrow, than lush, fertile Venezuela?
Baron Speck von Sternburg, a German diplomat and a longtime friend of the
president’s, had given TR over the years a shrewd idea of the worldview of Ger-
many’s militaristic ruling class. Expansionists like Chancellor Bernhard von
Bülow regarded the Monroe Doctrine as an insult, at most a hollow threat. Naval
secretary Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz made no secret of his desire to establish
naval bases in Brazil, where three hundred thousand Germans lived already, and
in the Caribbean. Germany, therefore, had TR’s particular attention as he braced
himself for foreign intervention in South America.
He could not have known that even then, strategists on the Wilhelm-
strasse—which is to say, in Germany’s foreign ministry—were working in the
deepest secrecy on a plan for the possible invasion of the United States. This plan
called for Tirpitz to dispatch his fleet to the Azores at the first signal of trans-
atlantic hostilities. From there, the fleet would steam south, take Puerto Rico,
and then launch surprise attacks along the American seaboard. German troops
advancing on New York City would march within a few miles of the Roosevelt
house in Oyster Bay, Long Island.
Lacking such detailed intelligence, the president had to rely on his intuition as
the Venezuelan crisis developed. Fortunately, in matters concerning the Monroe
Doctrine that intuition was acute indeed. He sensed the distant circling of a
predator. He gave notice in his annual message to Congress that the United
States was looking to its defenses. For the first time in the nation’s history, TR an-
nounced, “naval maneuvers on a large scale are being held under the immediate
command of the Admiral of the Navy [George Dewey].” Coincidentally or not,
those maneuvers were to be conducted in the same theater as the Anglo-German
blockade. On 21 November 1902, four battleships of the North Atlantic Squad-
ron arrived off the Puerto Rican island of Culebra. The four cruisers and two
gunboats of the Caribbean Squadron awaited them there. At other points in the
7 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 2, Art. 6
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss2/6
Western Hemisphere, more white warships put to sea, converging like slow
bullets upon the target area.
Seapower, an obsession of Roosevelt’s youth, had returned to haunt him as
commander in chief. Since entering the White House he had been “straining
every nerve to keep on with the up building of our Navy.”7 Perhaps his most im-
portant achievement in that regard had been the appointment of ardent strate-
gic reformers as secretary of the Navy and chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
William H. Moody and Admiral
Taylor were working to create a
larger, more war-ready fleet, and
they did not lack for funds. Roo-
sevelt’s first message to Congress
had generated enough money to finance the construction of two battleships and
two armored cruisers, and there had been a special appropriation for the Carib-
bean maneuvers. The president had, at the urging of a messianic young lieuten-
ant named William S. Sims, instigated a fleetwide program to improve gunnery.
With less fanfare, he had also organized a six-month survey of the Venezuelan
coastline and had transferred control of Culebra to the Navy Department, “in
case of sudden war.”
In 1902, tables of naval strength worldwide ranked the United States behind
Britain, France, and Russia in tonnage of ships built and building, but ahead of
Germany at 507,000 to 458,000 tons. This position would soon improve, since
the United States had, thanks to Theodore Roosevelt, more tonnage under con-
struction than any other country except Britain. However, Germany had more
warships in commission, especially in the Atlantic, at twelve battleships to eight.
American ships were more heavily armed, with standard twelve-inch and thirteen-
inch guns; but in November 1902 Germany enjoyed an advantage in aggregate
fighting mass of about 50 percent.
For two years, tacticians at the Naval War College had been trying to combat
this advantage in war games played on oceans of floor-sized charts. They sat
cross-legged on “islands” and perched on “mainland” stools, throwing dice to
send their celluloid ships (blue for the United States, black for Germany) creep-
ing across the gridlines, trailing dotted wakes and firing off tiny broadsides of
pencil lead. The results were not encouraging. In almost every engagement
BLACK prevailed, the sheer range and accuracy of its fire combining to scatter
BLUE all over the gaming floor. In Germany, meanwhile, tacticians concluded
that their navy could seize key harbors in any Caribbean confrontation.
Roosevelt himself was convinced that the forthcoming maneuvers would
show better than any calculation by college or committee how much seapower
the United States actually had. Real ships and real guns were being committed to
M O R R I S 7 7
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this game; if Germany and Britain wanted to splash in the same water, they
would have to play by American rules, or the game would become deadly.
He was able to send a subtle but unmistakable signal to this effect in the exec-
utive dining room of the White House on 24 November. Baron von Sternburg
was the guest of honor. “Specky,” as he was popularly known, had been a young
diplomat in the German embassy in Washington in the late 1880s, when Roosevelt
had been head of the U.S. Civil Service Commission. At the same table sat the
Englishman John St. Loe Strachey, editor of the Spectator and another member
of Roosevelt’s broad circle of foreign friends. Von Sternburg was well connected
on the Wilhelmstrasse, and Strachey, through his magazine, was one of the most
powerful opinion shapers in Britain. Both men could be counted on to return
home with the kind of intelligence that, in von Sternburg’s phrase, was “better
talked over than written.”
Between them that night Roosevelt placed someone who could not fail to
impress them, Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, who was about to assume
command of the Caribbean exercises. Dewey (whose rank had been specially
created by Congress in 1899) was America’s greatest military hero. He had de-
stroyed the entire Spanish fleet at Manila on 1 May 1898—and, given a chance,
would have destroyed the German fleet there too. Blessed by Farragut and
anointed by McKinley, he had an almost holy aura. Genteel ladies wore little
cameos of him in their bosoms; some Filipinos reportedly believed that he com-
municated directly with God. The admiral was now almost sixty-five. His im-
maculate mustache was graying, his well pressed uniform no longer hung as
straight as it once had, and his mahogany tan had been pinkened by too many
good luncheons at the Metropolitan Club. He tended to nod off at odd mo-
ments. Awake, however, Dewey still had formidable authority, accentuated by
the glitter of four gold stars. TR had selected him for the forthcoming maneu-
vers, his last command, to ensure world attention. Moreover, Dewey was the
most notorious Germanophobe in the United States—as Baron von Sternburg
well knew.
Next day, 25 November, Britain and Germany officially informed the State
Department that they intended to proceed against Venezuela. Secretary of State
John Hay replied that the United States greatly deplored any European interven-
tion in the affairs of the South American republic, while conceding that the ac-
tion in this case was justifiable. The U.S. armada at Culebra was swelled by a
flotilla of support vessels, including colliers and torpedo boats. Farther south,
two battleships and four cruisers of the European and South Atlantic Squadrons
rendezvoused north of Trinidad at a point only 125 miles from the Venezuelan
coastline. On the first day of December, Admiral Dewey departed the Washing-
ton Navy Yard in the presidential yacht Mayflower.
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There was nothing TR could do while
Dewey sailed south except monitor how
the Anglo-German blockade proceeded
against Venezuela and wait for an oppor-
tunity to invoke the Monroe Doctrine
once and for all. He believed that “only
power, and the willingness and readi-
ness to use it,” would make Germany
understand the doctrine fully.8 The next
week he remained in the White House.
The American public closely followed
newspaper accounts of the blockade,
while remaining sublimely unaware of the alert status of the U.S. Navy, let alone
the tense state of the president’s nerves.
By 4 December, Secretary of the Navy Moody had authorized a concentration
of fifty-three warships, the largest deployment the Navy had yet seen, compared
with twenty-nine Anglo-German vessels. The imbalance of fifty-three to
twenty-nine signified little, of course, since neither armada was intending battle,
but Roosevelt had instant strength available if he needed it. He knew the histori-
cal propensity of blockaders to become invaders.
On 7 December, Germany and Britain informed President Castro that they
were closing their consulates in Caracas and initiating “specific measures” to sat-
isfy their claims against Venezuela. Admiral Dewey simultaneously took com-
mand of the fleet off Culebra and issued orders to be ready to move at an hour’s
notice. He began an immediate program of practice landings along stretches of
Puerto Rican shoreline that resembled the coast of Venezuela.
The following morning, the German ambassador to the United States, Theodor
von Holleben, visited the White House with a party of his compatriots. The ap-
pointment was ceremonial; however, it gave TR a chance to talk to the ambassa-
dor privately without attracting the attention of reporters. The reason for his
circumspection was that he knew that, through von Holleben, he was dealing
with the most dangerous man in the world—Wilhelm II.
The emperor of Germany loomed clear in his imagination. Although the two
men had not yet met, Roosevelt had a shrewd idea of how dangerous Wilhelm
could be. Roosevelt the Germanist admired the kaiser’s finer Teutonic qualities,
as indeed he did those of Bismarck and Helmuth von Moltke. He was also aware
of some beguiling similarities between Wilhelm and himself. Only three months
separated their dates of birth, Roosevelt being the senior. Physically they were
alike in their burly, grinning vitality, their hunting prowess, and their conquest
of juvenile disabilities—in TR’s case, chronic asthma, in the kaiser’s, a withered
M O R R I S 7 9
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left arm. They had the same quick nerves, charm, explosive speech, the same ten-
dency to moralize. They were both catholic in intellect and encyclopedic in
memory. They shared a passion for things military, identifying particularly with
seapower.
However, as TR once pointed out, the superficial similarities between men
(and between nations) only accentuate their serious differences. In contrast to
his own steely sense of direction, he saw a waywardness in Wilhelm. The kaiser
was vain, coarse, romantic, and often foolish, xenophobic in general and
anti-Semitic in particular, given to hoarse shouts of “ein Volk, ein Reich, ein
Gott!” His bouts of rage were so violent as to make onlookers physically sick.
What may have especially worried Theodore Roosevelt was Wilhelm’s inclina-
tion toward fantasy: “He writes to me pretending that he is a descendent of
Frederick the Great. I know better and feel inclined to tell him so.”9 The kaiser
even liked to dress up as Frederick. TR understood that in negotiating with Wil-
helm he must at all times remember the importance of show—or, in diplomatic
parlance, “face.” It would be foolhardy to humiliate a person like that in the Ca-
ribbean. Tho retreat if retreat were made to look glamorous.
Having taken Ambassador von Holleben aside, TR spoke with extreme em-
phasis: “I told him to tell the Kaiser that I put Dewey in charge of our fleet to
maneuver in West Indian waters, that the world at large would know this merely
as a maneuver, and we should strive in every way to appear simply as cooperating
with the Germans, but that I regretted to say . . . that I should be obliged to inter-
fere, by force if necessary, if Germany took any action that looked like the acqui-
sition of territory in Venezuela or elsewhere in the Caribbean.”
The tactfulness of this warning was lost on von Holleben, who doggedly
repeated Germany’s official position. The kaiser, he said, had no intention of
taking permanent possession of Venezuelan territory. TR replied, with a touch
of sarcasm, that he was sure Wilhelm felt the same about Kiaochow and its
ninety-nine-year lease. Again von Holleben failed to react. The president po-
litely informed him that he would wait ten days for a total disclaimer from
Berlin. If none was forthcoming, Admiral Dewey would be ordered south “to
observe matters along Venezuela.”
“You gave that Dutchman something to think about,” said TR’s secretary,
William Loeb, as the ambassador escorted his party out. But Loeb wondered if
von Holleben had the courage to transmit an ultimatum. “I do not think, Mr.
President, that he will give the Kaiser a correct picture of your attitude.”
The blockade turned violent the next morning, 9 December. Four Venezuelan
gunboats were seized by the allies, and three of them were destroyed by Germany.
President Castro, in a panic, proposed that all claims against his country be arbi-
trated, and he asked the United States to intercede for him to that end. John Hay
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relayed this proposal to London and Berlin, while Roosevelt considered the im-
plications of his secret ultimatum to the kaiser. The sinking of the gunboats
struck him as “an act of brutality and useless revenge.” If Wilhelm II was this
willing to lay violent hands on Venezuelan shipping, what price Venezuelan real
estate?
More than ever the president suspected that Germany wanted to establish a
strongly fortified place near the future isthmian canal. This triggered his strate-
gic alarm bells, especially those related to naval deployment. Neither the Pacific
nor the Far Eastern Squadron, more than eight thousand miles away, was needed
for Caribbean duty; even so, Roosevelt remembered that during the Spanish-
American War it had taken the battleship Oregon sixty-four days to rush from
San Francisco to Florida via Cape
Horn. There shimmered in his
mind an image of a waterway with
locks across Panama, between the
wings of his divided fleet. Roose-
velt was pledged to violence now,
with only nine days remaining of his ultimatum. In Berlin, Speck von Sternburg
warned Vice Chancellor von Bülow and state secretary Oswald von Richthofen
against “basking in [any] illusions” about Theodore Roosevelt’s statements
regarding the Monroe Doctrine. Von Sternburg—expressive, self-effacing, but
cunning—had his own interests in mind. He knew that TR was not happy with
Ambassador von Holleben and would prefer more congenial company in Wash-
ington. “I feel absolutely confident,” he secretly wrote the president, “that a radi-
cal change must take place [in our embassy]. Of course, I did not say a word in
regard to myself as a candidate.”10 (Roosevelt did not mind members of his se-
cret diplomatic fraternity advancing themselves, since by so doing they usually
advanced American foreign policy.) Von Sternburg’s letter went on, “The Vene-
zuelan crisis is causing a considerable stir here in Berlin.”
There seemed to be a similar stir in London, where St. Loe Strachey, well
primed by his White House dinner, was railing in the Spectator against “one of
the most amazing and discreet alliances ever made by Britain with a foreign
power.” British foreign opinion was generally against shared adventurism. And
in the United States, newspaper hostility to Germany rose to such a pitch that
von Holleben, conquering his usual fear of annoying the kaiser, sent a concerned
cable to the Wilhelmstrasse. Von Bülow passed it on to His Majesty, who
scrawled irritatedly in the margin, “Our ambassador is over there to take the
pulse of the press and to comment when necessary by administering proper
treatment himself.” Wilhelm agreed, however, that Germany should refrain
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from any more unilateral displays of force. “We will allow our flag to follow the
lead of the British,” he said.
The ink on his superscription was barely dry when the Royal Navy obliged off
Puerto Cabello. The captain of an armored cruiser there, responding to some per-
ceived threat, bombarded the Venezuelan coast, and a German cruiser joined in.
Still, Roosevelt believed that Germany was the really formidable party in the
alliance. Arthur Balfour’s British government had to find a way out if a promis-
ing rapprochement with the United States that had been developing since 1899
was not to be jeopardized. One thing was certain in TR’s mind, on the basis of his
private sources: if there was any altercation over the Monroe Doctrine in Vene-
zuela, Britain would instantly declare its neutrality and leave Germany to deal
with Admiral Dewey.
Sunday, 14 December, dawned gray and bitingly cold in Washington. The
White House stood shrouded in weekend quiet, but the countdown to war was
continuing. Four more such dawns, and Roosevelt’s deadline would expire.
Then, unexpectedly, von Holleben asked to see the president. Von Holleben was
ein Diplomat alterer Schule, a diplomat of the old school. He had a booming
laugh, which he used to forestall conversational attack. He preferred to do business
in writing, with long delays between dispatch and response. The keystones of his
diplomacy were concern about America’s rise to world power and what John
Hay called his “mortal terror” of the kaiser.
If Roosevelt expected an answer to his ultimatum of 8 December, he was soon
disappointed. That Sunday von Holleben seemed interested in talking only
about the weather, of all things, and tennis. Losing patience, TR asked if Ger-
many was going to accept President Castro’s arbitration proposal transmitted by
Secretary of State Hay. The ambassador said no. Controlling his temper, the
president replied that Kaiser Wilhelm must understand that he, Roosevelt, was
“very definitely” threatening war.11 Von Holleben declined to be a party to such
peremptory language. The president replied that in that case, he must advance
his ultimatum by twenty-four hours. Calculating from 8 December, the deadline
would fall now on the 17th, rather than the 18th. Von Holleben, shaken, insisted
that Wilhelm II would not accept arbitration, and TR let him have the last word.
Secretary Loeb, who was in the adjoining office, saw the ambassador go, but
he made no record of his visit. Neither did clerks at the State Department or at
the German embassy. It suited everybody concerned that the diplomatic record
of this matter be blank from thenceforth; Wilhelm would be free to end the crisis
without evidence of having been coerced.
Von Holleben pondered TR’s incredible threat. He could transmit it now only
as a matter of extreme urgency. He had long been aware of a rise of anti-
Germanism in the United States, and he had once summoned up the courage to
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warn the kaiser that the Monroe Doctrine, as interpreted by President Roosevelt,
was not to be trifled with. Wilhelm had scoffed at his qualms: “We will do what-
ever is necessary for our Navy, even if it displeases the Yankees. Never fear!”12
Having been rebuffed once, von Holleben did not want to be dismissed as an
alarmist now. What if the president’s ultimatum turned out to be mere Rooseveltian
bluster? On the other hand, what if the president was serious? Von Holleben de-
cided to consult a German diplomat who knew TR well—the consul-general in
New York, Karl Bünz.
That evening, under cloak of a dense snowstorm, von Holleben registered at
the Cambridge Hotel in Manhattan. Some time during the next twenty-four
hours, Bünz assured him that the president was absolutely not bluffing. Nor was
TR’s short-term strategy flawed. The kaiser’s navy, whatever its worldwide
strength, was currently dispersed. Admiral Dewey was, therefore, in a position to
deal a brutal blow to German prestige in the Caribbean.
As von Holleben struggled with this frightening information, diplomatic
strains were developing between London and Berlin. Lord Lansdowne, the Brit-
ish foreign secretary, found himself in a difficult position—King Edward VII
was expressing annoyance at being allied with Germany against a negligible
South American power, whereas the German ambassador, Count Paul von
Metternich, was insisting that the kaiser would not arbitrate. Lansdowne thought
the whole Venezuelan question might best be referred to Washington for arbi-
tration by the president of the United States. But the Wilhelmstrasse would not
budge.
It was now Tuesday, 16 December. Fewer than twenty-four hours remained
before Roosevelt’s deadline. In New York, von Holleben visited Wall Street to
check the latest fluctuations of German-American and Latin American opinion.
In London, the British cabinet approved Lord Lansdowne’s American-arbitration
proposal, thus driving a wedge into the alliance. In Washington, the Roosevelt
cabinet met in closed session. In San Juan, Puerto Rico, a fast torpedo boat stood
ready to rush any emergency orders to Admiral Dewey. Admiral Taylor alerted
naval intelligence to communicate with the fleet only in cipher, and he in-
structed his aides that the Caribbean maneuvers were no longer a proper subject
for public discussion. Nevertheless, reporters soon learned that Dewey’s battle-
ship squadron was now headed from Culebra for Trinidad, only sixty miles from
Venezuela.
By now the German ambassador’s absence from Washington was causing
comment along Embassy Row. He was scheduled to attend an evening reception
at the British embassy, and protocol clearly required that he make an appear-
ance. But when the time came, von Holleben was not to be seen. Neither were his
military and naval attachés. They too had slipped out of town, to join him in
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New York. From there, before midnight, certain words flashed to Berlin. Roose-
velt was never to know exactly in what terms von Holleben transmitted the
American threat of war, only that the threat got through—on a night when the
transatlantic cable became so electric with communications that even the Times
of London was denied access. The evidence suggests that von Holleben’s cable
was burned after reading, in approved German security fashion.
The reaction in Berlin was immediate. On 17 December, the Reichstag de-
cided to accept arbitration, acting secretly and in such haste that urgings from
Secretary Hay in Washington and Metternich in London were redundant on re-
ceipt. TR’s deadline passed in peace.
The Venezuelan episode was not over, and the blockade was not officially to
end until a settlement was reached in a protocol signed in February 1903, but a
massive release of tension was felt in governments on both sides of the Atlantic.
On 19 December 1902, Germany and Britain formally invited Roosevelt to
arbitrate their claims against Venezuela. TR said he would think about it and left
town with his children to spend a day or two in the pinewoods of Northern Vir-
ginia. His secretary announced that the president had been under great strain,
“both mentally and physically . . . in the Venezuela crisis.”13 This was the nearest
that Roosevelt ever got to a public acknowledgment that there had indeed been a
crisis involving himself.
Theodor von Holleben, for his part, suffered the classic fate of all messengers
who convey bad news to autocratic rulers. Roosevelt’s triumph was the ambassa-
dor’s disgrace. He had misjudged a president, misled an emperor, and nearly
started a war. His only consolation was that the Wilhelmstrasse could not cite
these as reasons for his recall without making its decision to arbitrate seem to
have been forced. To save the kaiser’s face, it was necessary to save von
Holleben’s. Discreet cooperation from the White House made both expedients
possible. The ambassador remained in New York while arrangements were made
to bring him home on permanent “disability” leave. “I am a sick man,” he told a
reporter. “I cannot answer a single question.”14 He was given just two weeks to
wind up his affairs in Washington, and on 5 January 1903 the kaiser canceled his
credentials.15 He left town without saying goodbye to Roosevelt or John Hay, and
when he sailed from Hoboken, New Jersey, on the 10th, not a single member of
the diplomatic corps or any German official dared to see him off.
But before he died, less than two years later, he would receive a letter of tender
regard from the president of the United States.
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